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ABSTRACT
The provision of flood insurance is a patchwork, with countries show-
ing varying degrees of penetration, coverage types, demand levels, and
design structures. This article explores the current understanding of
flood insurance with a specific focus on the ability of flood insurance
to contribute to direct risk reduction. The starting point is a consider-
ation of the existing provision of flood insurance, both in established
insurance markets and in developing countries. A review of efforts to
analyse and explain the use and design of flood insurance highlights
how the understanding of supply and demand determinants is steadily
growing, while clear gaps also emerge. Particularly the question of uti-
lizing flood insurance in the context of climate change and as a lever
for physical risk reduction would benefit from further empirical and
theoretical analysis. The article concludes with a reflection on current
efforts to reform and design flood insurance and offers some pointers
for future research.
∗ This article has been produced under the research project ENHANCE (Enhancing risk
management partnerships for catastrophic natural disasters in Europe), funded by the
European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme — Grant agreement
no. 308438.
ISSN 1932-1465; DOI 10.1561/101.00000062
c© 2014 S. Surminski
242 Surminski
Keywords: Flood insurance; disaster risk reduction; flood risk
management; insurance; natural hazards; climate change;
adaptation.
JEL Codes: M2, H84, H3, G22, G28
1 Introduction
Everyday many individuals, organizations, governments, and businesses buy
insurance to transfer the risk of facing an uncertain loss in exchange for
paying a certain premium. This mechanism has been used for centuries,
reducing the uncertainty of financial loss by spreading risk across a large
number of the insured. It has become an important cornerstone not only of
economic activity but also of social policy: without insurance many activities
and processes would be deemed too risky and would not be undertaken, and
those affected by a loss might struggle to recover.
Today, insurance is available to cover virtually any type of risk — as
long as there is supply and demand for the risk transfer. One area that has
recently seen a surge in political debates, academic research and commercial
explorations is that of flood insurance, aimed at covering the direct impacts
of flood events, such as property damage and business interruption.1
Floods are one of the most wide-reaching and commonly occurring natural
hazards in the world, affecting on average about 70 million people each year
(UNISDR, 2011). Recent loss trends are rising, largely due to socio-economic
factors, while climate change is also expected to exacerbate the impacts of
flooding (IPCC, 2012, 2014).
The rapid increase in global economic losses from flooding has re-
intensified discussions among private insurers, governments, and interna-
tional organizations about the role of insurance in addressing these risks.
The discourse follows two broad strands: reform efforts for existing insurance
schemes, such as systems in the United Kingdom and the United States; and
efforts to design new schemes in less established markets, for example, see
Swenja Surminski and Delioma Oramas-Dorta (2013).
While this is foremost a question of sharing risks and distributing the costs
of compensation and recovery, there is a further dimension beyond financial
preparedness: purchasing an insurance risk transfer product can influence
1 Indirect risks arising from policies and actions taken to respond to those risks are beyond the
scope of this review. See for an overview: Surminski (2013).
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the behaviour of those at risk. This can either be in a moral hazard2 context,
where insurance can lead to a more risky behavior, or as an incentive, where
insurance can trigger risk reduction investments or the implementation of
prevention measures (see for example the work of Kunreuther and colleagues
at Wharton: Kunreuther, 1996; Kunreuther et al., 2013; Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan, 2009; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006) and the work at IIASA
by Mechler and Linnerooth-Bayer (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2009;
Linerooth-Bayer et al., 2011).
With the prospect of growing impacts from flooding due to climate change
and socio-economic growth this prevention role of insurance appears to have
received renewed attention from policy makers: In 2013, the European Com-
mission (EC) launched the Green Paper on the insurance of natural and
man-made disasters (EC, 2013), which reflects on the concerns about rising
risk levels and how this can be accommodated through new and existing
flood insurance schemes. The consultation document frames insurance in
two ways: the question of availability and affordability, and the potential to
use insurance as a lever for flood prevention and disaster damage mitigation.
The EC specifically asks in the consultation how risk transfer can reduce
disaster risks today and into the future.
A review of the evidence from the literature and the market suggests the
following answer: ‘yes in theory, not really in practice’ (see, for example,
Botzen and van den Bergh, 2009; Mills, 2009; Surminski and Oramas-Dorta,
2011). Why is this the case?
This article aims to shed more light on this question by reviewing the
current understanding of flood insurance. The starting point is a consider-
ation of the existing provision of flood insurance, both in established insur-
ance markets and in developing countries (Section 2). A review of efforts
to analyse and explain the use and design of flood insurance (Section 3)
highlights how the understanding of supply and demand determinants is
steadily growing, while clear gaps also emerge. Particularly the question of
utilizing flood insurance in the context of climate change and as a lever for
physical risk reduction would benefit from further empirical and theoreti-
cal analysis (Section 4). The article concludes with a reflection on current
2 Moral hazard occurs when a member of the party acts conversely to the principles set out in
an agreement between those parties. For example in an insurance contract, the individuals’
motives and behaviour to prevent loss may be reduced if ﬁnancially protected through a policy,
thus resulting in an increased probability of loss. For more detail on moral hazard, please see
Arrow (1968) and Pauly (1968).
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efforts to reform and design flood insurance and offers some pointers for
future research (Section 5).
2 The Flood Insurance Status Quo
The use of insurance for the management of flooding and other natural
disaster losses differs widely across the world (for example, see Paudel et al.,
2012). Penetration rates, types of products and operational mechanics of
insurance schemes vary from country to country. This range of approaches
is determined by several factors including risk drivers, cultures, regulatory
demands, and the economic environment (Brainard, 2008; Feyen et al., 2011,
Hussels et al., 2005; Swiss Re, 2004; USAID, 2006). Below is an overview of
the current set-up of flood insurance.
2.1 Where is Flood Insurance Available?
Estimates indicate that in developing countries only 5% of direct natural
hazard disaster losses are insured as compared with 40% in developed coun-
tries (DfiD, 2013). This picture corresponds to a large extent with the uneven
application of general insurance across countries, with risk transfer still in its
infancy in most developing countries (see CEA, 2011a). However, for low and
medium income countries there is evidence of a range of new schemes being
implemented. These are often in response to existing demand and supply
challenges, testing new innovative forms, such as micro-insurance, or index-
based risk transfers. The ClimateWise Compendium (ClimateWise, 2011a)
on disaster risk transfer, documents 123 existing initiatives in middle-income
and lower-income countries that involve the transfer of financial risk asso-
ciated with the occurrence of natural hazards such as flooding (Surminski
and Oramas-Dorta, 2011). Recent examples are the African Risk Capacity
Facility3 (ARC, 2014) and the introduction of index-based flood insurance4
3 The African Risk Capacity Facility (ARC) is a specialised agency proposed and led by the
African Union and aims to support extreme weather events and natural disaster risks through
establishing a risk pool into which donors and member countries pay an annual premium. The
scope of the scheme is supported throughout the whole of Africa and aims to insure the risk of
drought in the Sub-Saharan area. Although currently at design stage and subject to change,
the ARC is a solidaristic approach providing government with much needed disaster ﬁnancing
and the capacity to rapidly distribute funds for post-emergency services (ARC, 2014).
4 Index based insurance is insurance that indemniﬁes all policyholders in a deﬁned geographic
area for when a particular threshold is passed based on certain criteria. This maybe crop or
livestock losses or weather related parameters such a particular temperature or level of rainfall,
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in Peru termed the Extreme El Nino Insurance Product (EENIP)5 (Global-
AgRisk, 2013).
Even within well-developed insurance markets clear differences with
regards to the provision of flood insurance exist, as the example of Europe
demonstrates (see Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014). Some observers identify a
growing ‘flood resilience gap’ in developed markets — with the level of
insurance cover for flood and other disaster losses being fairly static, while
state disaster relief expenditure is increasing, as recently seen in the United
States (Weiss and Weidman, 2013).
Summaries of existing coverage from the European insurance and rein-
surance federation (CEA, 2009) identify a patchwork of schemes, with
the extent and scope of risk transfer varying from country to country
(Table 1), and — as the case of Germany shows — even across regions
within a country. The Netherlands does not have flood insurance beyond
some commercial policies, despite several efforts over the last few years to
introduce residential cover (see for example Botzen and van den Bergh,
2008; Surminski et al., 2014).
The data provision that underpins these overviews is fairly limited — for
most countries this is based on aggregate estimates — and more specific
breakdowns of who buys a particular type of insurance (gender, age, social
status and other aspects) are generally not available. The aggregate penetra-
tion data also does not differentiate between public and privately provided
insurance cover. The current picture therefore gives an indication of insur-
ance levels within a country, but does not allow more detailed analysis of
their features.
and is often based on aggregated criteria. The cost of setting up and administering an index
based scheme is often much lower as well as avoiding the issues of moral hazard and adverse
selection. However, one limitation is basis risk whereby any risk not reﬂected in the index
results in loss. This may occur for several reasons including, if the measurement for the index
threshold as used by the insurers’ diﬀers to that of the policyholders, and when the calculation
for the index does not cover a ‘useful’ risk or fully reﬂect the risk in question. Managing this
basis risk is essential when scaling up index insurance schemes to prevent policyholders being
exposed to risks not covered in the index and in fact increasing their risk overall (IFAD, 2011).
5 The Peruvian Flood Index (ENSO) insurance scheme is an index based scheme aimed at
businesses in an eﬀort to prevent business interruption. It also addresses risk awareness through
capacity building initiatives. The scheme has been developed by GlobalAgRisk and sold by La
Positiva, a Peruvian insurer. The index is based on sea surface temperature as a proxy for loss.
Diﬀerent contracts are available with diﬀerent threshold losses, with a maximum payout at a
temperature of 27◦C (ClimateWise, 2011a).
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Table 1. Insurance coverage and penetration rate for different natural catas-
trophes across Europe.
Source: CEA, 2009.
2.2 What Flood Insurance Products do Exist?
While mainly descriptive and illustrative, existing overviews provide an out-
line of the wide range of different types of insurance schemes in operation —
ranging from private market solutions to publicly funded risk pools, includ-
ing compulsory schemes and completely voluntary offerings (CCS, 2008;
CEA, 2009).
The Role of Insurance in Reducing Direct Risk 247
The products through which flood risk can be transferred also differ
according to what they cover and who the insured are:
• property insurance for homeowners, businesses, and public entities;
• sovereign disaster risk transfer aims to increase the financial response capac-
ity of governments in the aftermath of natural disasters. This protects their
long-term fiscal balances through insurance or insurance-linked securities
(e.g., catastrophe bonds, catastrophe swaps, and weather hedges);
• agricultural insurance cover for farmers, herders, and agricultural financing
institutions for losses arising from adverse natural hazards, provided as
either ‘‘index-based’’ or ‘‘indemnity-based’’;
• natural disaster micro-insurance aimed protecting the livelihoods of the
poor against natural hazard events;
• business interruption covering loss of income during the time that normal
operation cannot be continued; and finally
• reinsurance for a portion or all of a risk portfolio from an insurer to spread
the risk and protect solvency.
Flood insurance schemes in high-income countries are mostly aimed at prop-
erty risks as well as agriculture, with the majority of losses in developed mar-
kets arising from property and business interruption losses (Mills, 2005). For
low and medium income economies the ClimateWise Compendium shows
that agricultural insurance is the most common type in all income categories.
Traditional indemnity-based schemes are the dominant type in upper-middle
income countries, and newer index-based schemes have a larger share in low-
and lower middle-income countries. This could be related to the fact that
schemes in those two income groups have only emerged recently and are
often specifically designed to test the use of index-based risk transfer as a
way to overcome enormous transaction costs, adverse selection, and moral
hazard (Murphy et al., 2011). Nevertheless concerns about addressing basis
risk, remain (Government Office for Science, 2010; Linnerooth-Bayer and
Mechler, 2009). Disaster micro-insurance is common in low-income and lower
middle- income countries, but property catastrophe insurance schemes are
almost absent from these countries (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2011).
2.3 Is Flood Insurance Mandatory or Bought on a Voluntary Basis?
In most countries, flood insurance is purchased on a voluntary basis,
although homeowners and farmers may be required to take up insurance
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as part of mortgage and loan requirements. Some countries have a manda-
tory component, such as Spain, Belgium, and France6 (Botzen and van den
Bergh, 2009; Paudel et al., 2012) [see Table 1], while in developing countries
some contract farmers are required to take out insurance (Surminski and
Oramas-Dorta, 2013).
2.4 Is Flood Insurance Provided by the Private Sector or by the State?
The provision of flood insurance ranges from completely private market
solutions to state-provided schemes. Within this range there are a variety
of schemes, in many cases based on a degree of public–private partnership.
Business insurance is usually provided by the private market, while pub-
lic involvement in the provision of residential flood insurance is very com-
mon, with many countries applying some form of public–private arrange-
ment (Aakre et al., 2010; Bruggeman et al., 2010; Paudel et al., 2012;
Schwarze et al., 2011). One example of a state-managed insurance scheme
is the French CatNat (Catastrophes Naturelles) system, a natural catastro-
phe coverage scheme, administered through private intermediaries (GFDRR,
2012, Chapter 8; Paudel et al., 2012). Other schemes purely underwritten
by the public sector are the public cantonal property insurers (KGVs) for
weather related hazard damages in Switzerland (Schwarze et al., 2011) or
Spain’s Consorcio de Compensacio´n de Seguros, a state monopoly (CCS,
2008). However, for most schemes there is a certain degree of private sector
involvement. The role of private insurers’ spans underwriting, premium col-
lection, claims handling, risk assessment, and awareness raising, as well as
risk management advice and lobbying for political and regulatory responses
(Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2011; Paudel et al., 2012).
In the United Kingdom the underwriting is provided by the private sector,
while government maintains a role in terms of flood risk information and
flood management — as outlined in the Statement of Principles (SoP) (ABI,
2008). This approach is now being reviewed and will change from 2015.
How the roles of public and private agents are split also differs widely
across the spectrum. The role of the state can be limited to preserve fair
competition and financial viability of the insurer. State interventions can
also boost the market through backing of the private market (government
6 The mandatory component of each of these schemes relates to the purchase of ﬂood insurance
alongside other perils. In Spain and France ﬂood insurance is compulsory when buying property
insurance and in Belgium it is compulsory when ﬁre insurance is purchased (Paudel et al.,
2012).
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led reinsurance, investing in preventative measures or by compelling insur-
ance) and by doing so expand the market. In addition there is the public role
in flood risk management. Often widely regarded as a public function, flood
risk management complements flood insurance as a risk management tool
without which insurance may not function effectively. The United Kingdom’s
SoP approach, with private insurers underwriting and administering policies,
relies on government commitment to public investment in flood defences.
The new system, Flood Re, seems to have less emphasis on the role of pub-
lic risk management (Surminski and Eldridge, 2014). This points towards
sharing the financial burden of flooding perhaps rather than reducing
losses.
For low and middle-income countries the ClimateWise Compendium on
disaster risk transfer (ClimateWise, 2011a) differentiates between the risk
transfer role and other roles, such as operational support functions. For the
provision of the actual risk transfer for flood insurance the following picture
emerges: the private sector is providing the actual risk transfer in 41% of
schemes, with varying risk levels and volumes of insurance and reinsurance
layers included in the different schemes. In the majority of cases where the
public sector is involved in risk transfer, it does so in partnership with the
private sector (52%). These partnerships between the public and private sec-
tors dominate in the provision of risk transfer in the case of indemnity-based
agricultural insurance schemes, property catastrophe insurance schemes, and
sovereign schemes. For index-based agricultural insurance schemes, however,
provision of risk transfer by the private sector is more frequent. There is
no exclusive public provision of index insurance by the public sector for
schemes covering flood. For micro-insurance schemes, the three models are
equally present. The role of the third sector in the provision of risk transfer
is comparatively small (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2011). Private sec-
tor capacity does not currently appear to be a limitation (Dizard, 2014),
particularly at European level (Swiss Re, 2013).
2.5 What are the Operational Characteristics of Flood Insurance?
The existing flood insurance schemes differ significantly in terms of aim,
approach, and functionality. The French Cat Nat aims to increase afford-
ability, reduce adverse selection, and offers low priced public reinsurance
covering several hazards including flooding. Funding is through a flat rate
surcharge (6–12%) over existing policies against property damages (Botzen
and van den Bergh, 2008; Poussin et al., 2013).
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Figure 1. Number of flood insurance schemes by scheme type and pub-
lic–private involvement.
Source: Surminski and Oramas-Dorta (2013).
The Spanish Insurance Compensation Consortium (CCS) scheme is an
example of a solidaristic approach to provision of flood insurance. Flood
insurance is granted on a subsidiary basis, through a flat rate surcharge
if damages are not covered by private insurance. A deductible over public
compensation applies with private insurance offered in a bundled system
(ICC, 2014). Bundling, when used to insure against selected risks, makes cer-
tain other risks compulsory, as in the case of flood insurance and vice versa.
Not only does bundling increase market penetration but also reduces
adverse selection and can encourage DRR through risk based pricing.
However, it can result in unaffordable or inequitable premiums burden-
ing schemes such as the CCS (Sugarman, 2006), raising issues including
deductibles, co-insurance and caps (Sugarman, 2006).
Voluntary flood insurance schemes include those in Sweden and Portugal.
Issued and managed through private insurers, policies are not backed by the
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state. Risk based pricing is applied only in Portugal, while in Sweden the
location of the asset does not influence the premium to be paid (Maccaferri
et al., 2012). Pricing in these cases seems not be the influencing factor in
determining penetration rate, with mortgage lenders requiring borrowers
to insure buildings in Sweden, resulting in high penetration rates above
90% (Maccaferri et al., 2012). In contrast, Portugal does not follow this
requirement and rates are much lower at 50%.
The US National Flood Insurance Programme is perhaps one of the most
widely known state funded flood insurance schemes. Covering properties in
areas where adequate floodplain management regulations are in place, with
compulsory coverage for those with federally backed mortgages in the 1 in
100 flood zone, the scheme is administered by private insurers and can only
be taken up by participating communities (Paudel et al., 2012). Recently
with reforms to address the programme’s debt (built up after Hurricane
Katrina), the provision of policies has moved significantly towards risk based
pricing (GAO, 2013).
3 What Explains the Current Set-Up?
A growing body of literature analyses and explains the use and design of
flood insurance. At an aggregate level, disparities in insurance penetration
across countries can be explained in the context of income levels — as shown
by the S-shaped relationship, referred to as the S-curve model,7 between
insurance penetration and GDP (Carter and Dickinson, 1992; Enz, 2000;
Outreville, 2011). Yet, the importance of effective and sound institutions
for a well-functioning insurance market are clear and several studies have
underlined the need for certain elements to be in place to drive the devel-
opment of insurance. For example, the availability of risk data (Brainard,
2008), education and financial literacy levels play a key role (Masci et al.,
2007) as well as characteristics of the market such as distribution channels
and the drive for innovative products and services (UNCTAD, 2004). Cus-
toms and traditions also play a part in explaining the different coverage
levels that exist across countries (see Feyen et al., 2011 and Hussels et al.,
2005 for reviews).
7 The S-curve is useful for long-term forecasting but as Enz (2000) states, it is only a one factor
model as it only uses real GDP per capita and neglects all other factors that inﬂuence the
demand for insurance — with some countries continually deviating from the curve (Enz, 2000).
252 Surminski
This helps to understand some of the disparities — for example, between
developed and developing countries at an aggregate level. However, explana-
tions for specific lines of insurance, such as flood insurance, require a more
nuanced analysis.
Research exploring flood insurance is a relatively small, but evolving field.
A recent Scopus search found 71 articles focused on Flood Insurance8 and
54 articles exploring Natural Disaster Insurance.9 Most of the existing work
on flood insurance is applied rather than theoretical, and evolves around
specific flood insurance schemes:
Recent work investigating the United States National Flood Insurance
Programme (NFIP) includes Knowles and Kunreuther (2014), Dehring and
Halek (2013), Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012), Thomas and Leichenko (2011),
Casadonte and Nevius (2012), Dixon et al. (2006), and Aerts and Botzen
(2011a).
The situation in Germany has recently been investigated by Seifert et al.
(2013), Zahn and Neuss (2011) and Keskitalo et al., (2014).
Two examples for the Netherlands are Jongman et al. (2014) and Botzen
and van den Bergh (2008). Recent work investigating the flood insurance
provision in the United Kingdom includes Ball et al. (2013), Stallworthy
(2013), Penning-Rowsell et al. (2014), and Surminski and Eldridge (2014).
Flood insurance in the context of developing countries is receiving grow-
ing attention, as the work from Ranger et al. (2011a), Lin et al. (2007),
Linnerooth-Bayer et al. (2011) and Surminski and Oramas-Dorta (2013)
show. Some studies are interested in legal aspects (Morgan and Stallworthy,
2012) and governance (Paudel et al., 2012) of flood insurance schemes.
The lenses applied to flood insurance by researchers can be broadly split
by disciplines: the majority of papers explore it in an economic context,
routed in the economics of risk and uncertainty and in financial theory. This
also includes political economy and insurance economics with research into
financial aspects such as scheme design and type of risk transfer, but also
work on behaviour issues, moral hazard and adverse selection. While dif-
fering in approach and method, these existing strands of literature all seek
8 This search is conducted for any mentions of ‘ﬂood insurance’ in the title of articles on Scopus.
For a search of ‘ﬂood insurance’ in titles, abstract, and keywords of articles gives a return of
490 articles.
9 Scopus search, title only, for ‘disaster insurance’ returns 54 articles, for ‘natural disaster insur-
ance’, 23 articles are returned. Expanding this to include the title, abstract and keyword returns
869 and 390, respectively.
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to increase understanding of at least one of the following three areas: sup-
ply, demand and design. A fourth aspect that appears to receive growing
attention is rather cross-cutting: the roles of public and private sectors in
flood insurance provision. The following sections illustrate the current state
of knowledge for these four areas. In an attempt to capture the broad spec-
trum of flood insurance research this review is structured around a set of
questions, collected in discussions with policy makers, industry representa-
tives, and academics (Surminski et al., 2014).
3.1 Demand: Why do Some People Buy Flood Insurance and Others
do not?
The decision to buy insurance is an example of economic decision making
under uncertainty. In the most simple model this decision is driven by
income, price, and attitude towards risk (Schlesinger, 2013). The literature
offers a range of other factors, deemed to play a role in influencing the
decision to buy insurance, although empirical evidence for this is some-
what limited. Table 2 summarizes these ‘beyond income’ drivers for non-life
insurance.
While most of these determinants help to explain general levels of insur-
ance penetration, such as income, stable legal frameworks or financial liter-
acy, there are also some factors that are deemed to be relevant specifically
for flood insurance:
• Mandatory flood insurance, such as in Norway or Iceland, usually leads to
high penetration rates (Bouwer et al., 2007; CCS, 2008; OECD, 2003).
• Perception of other available financing (Raschky et al., 2013).
For natural disasters the ‘risk factors’ are particularly relevant. Here a range
of studies have explored individual decisions to buy disaster insurance. At
the level of the consumer, researchers have focused on both the economically
significant determinants of demand, as well as, psychological factors impact-
ing consumer decision making. Browne and Hoyt (2000) list several reasons
behind this including; (1) adverse selection10 (Akerlof, 1970; Lin, 2013) (2)
underestimating tail probabilities (Kunreuther, 1984) and (3) expectation
10 Adverse selection occurs when those at increased risk have a greater demand for insurance with
the insurer unaware of this relationship. To counteract such occurrences increasing premiums
and limiting coverage to protect from large claims are strategies often used by insurers. For
more information on adverse selection please see Akerlof (1970) and Lin (2013).
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Table 2. Drivers of non-life insurance demand beyond income (from Ranger
and Surminski, 2013).
Group of Drivers Examples
Macroeconomic
factors
Economic stability
Low inflation rates
Developed and stable financial markets
Openness to trade
Political, regulatory
and legal factors
(including pre-
conditions for
insurance)
Stable legal and institutional frameworks
Adequate insurance law
Opening distribution channels (e.g. bancassurance)
Conducive regulatory environment
Property rights
Judicial efficiency and transparency
Mandatory insurance lines
Socio-cultural
factors
Education
Financial literacy
Religious and cultural attitudes to risk and insurance
Perception of other available financing in the event of a loss, such as disaster aid
Risk factors The nature of exposure, such as the number of cars
Natural catastrophe exposure
Risk awareness linked with recent catastrophe experience
Source: Brainard, 2008; Feyen et al., 2011, Hussels et al., 2005; Swiss Re, 2004; USAID,
2006.
that some other entity will pay for any damages to property or livelihood,
termed ‘charity hazard’ (Browne and Hoyt, 2000).
Further demand determinants include land assets owned (Sai et al., 2010),
how individuals’ decisions are affected by what others are doing in the local
area to mitigate risk (Luffman, 2010) and relative tax differentials on insur-
ance policies (Barker and Tooth, 2007). Behaviour economists have explored
this, with Kunreuther and Pauly (2005) providing a very detailed review
of anomalies in consumer purchasing decisions of insurance, the biggest
being that even when insurance is heavily subsidised, individuals still do
not buy it. This effect is even more perplexing when considering that many
people who have insurance do not need it in strict economic terms (Kun-
reuther and Pauly, 2005). Two particularly relevant psychological factors
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determining insurance purchases are risk aversion (Rabin and Thaler, 2001)
and ambiguity aversion (Cabantous, 2007). Early economic research found
that besides risk, individuals dislike ambiguous decision-making situations
(Ellsberg, 1961). This effect impacts not only those who purchase insurance,
but also those who underwrite it (Cabantous, 2007).
For developing countries, there are a range of additional challenges on
the demand side, as highlighted by the growing literature about index-
insurance, which investigates how best to overcome those demand issues
such as insufficient understanding of the product, the lack of experience
with insurance in general, and high prices (Cole et al., 2009; Hoff et al.,
2005; Warner et al., 2009).
3.2 Supply: What are the Challenges Facing Those Oﬀering
Flood Insurance?
The key consideration for private companies providing flood cover is to
match costs (including expected losses, expenses for risk assessment, prod-
uct development, marketing, operating, and claims processing) and (in the
case of private insurance) revenue with premium levels, unless it is seen as a
strategy investment to open up new markets or a pure PR or charity based
activity (Charpentier, 2008; Kunreuther et al., 2009). The decision to offer
coverage can be influenced by the loss experience, regulatory requirements
and the overall market conditions. Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner (2013)
investigate the impact of natural disaster losses and regulation on the supply
decisions of property insurers in the United States. Their empirical evidence
suggests that home insurers are more likely to reduce their cover supply in
response to unexpected severe events, while business insurers appear less
likely to change their coverage in response to changes in severity or frequency
of loss events (Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner, 2013). No similar research
has been conducted in markets across the EU, but it is obvious that after
a flood event, for instance, private insurers review their market position,
pricing and coverage offers — which may trigger a re-assessment of the way
flood insurance is provided, as currently seen in the United Kingdom.
At the same time the capacity of the insurance and reinsurance sector
to provide coverage is driven by a wide range of other factors, including
interest rates, regulation, overall market conditions and investment flows
into the insurance sector (Cummins and Mahul, 2009). There are several
factors that make the provision of natural disaster insurance at an affordable
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price challenging: it is difficult to estimate uncertain extreme events; in many
areas risk information is still very limited; and losses are volatile (Biener and
Eling, 2011). This can be classified under (1) information asymmetries11 and
(2) insurability issues.12 Both of these problems are intertwined: information
asymmetries, such as adverse selection, can threaten the economic viability
of the program, due to gaps between premiums received and claims paid
(Huber, 2011). Particularly for developing countries there are significant
supply side challenges for the provision of disaster insurance, such as high
transaction costs and inadequate distribution channels, as well as limited
availability of data and modelling tools, as presented by Ibarra and Skees
(2007) and Suarez and Linnerooth-Bayer (2011).
3.3 What Explains the Range of Public and Private Sector Schemes?
The way how flood insurance is provided differs widely across the world,
also with regards to the roles of the public and private sector. Supply and
demand challenges have led to a range of approaches, with both sides tak-
ing on different roles and responsibilities. One strand of literature considers
this in the context of ‘market failure’: on pure economic terms the public
sector gets involved when flood insurance is not adequately provided by the
private market [for example in the case of the US NFIP (GAO, 2013, p. 4;
Sugarman, 2006)]. The term ‘adequately’ points towards the normative side
of this aspect: the market failure can be subject to interpretation. Some see
affordability as a key indicator (with unaffordability justifying public inter-
vention), in a similar context as consumer protection justifies regulation of
private insurers (Mills, 2005). However, others see lack of demand as a key
justification for public intervention (Sugarman, 2006), while in other cases
the aim of solidarity seems to be seen as the key driver for public involvement
in flood insurance (O’Neill and O’Neill, 2012).
It remains unclear whether private or public insurance provision is more
effective. In the absence of a best practice template Paudel et al. (2012)
11 Information asymmetries describe when one member of a party has an advantage over the
other through increased or a diﬀerent understanding of the information available. In the case
of insurance this can lead to issues of moral hazard and adverse selection.
12 Insurability issues refer to a number of diﬀerent factors resulting in diﬃculties in transferring
a particular risk. These can include the costs of insuring, limited data availability, a lack of
adequate modelling tools, as well as traditions and norms of dealing with risk in particular
countries, for example, government assistance which can reduce the uptake of insurance (see
Dionne, 2000).
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propose a greater focus on public–private partnerships, where the govern-
ment and private insurers share the provision of underwriting. The term
partnership is very broadly used, but has its roots in efforts to increase the
efficiency of public service by engaging the private sector. What is less clear
are the rules of these partnerships and how they can deal with changing risk
levels. This is investigated in Section 4.1.
The role of the state as an insurer of last resort is also an important
consideration. Governments are expected to be increasingly called upon to
address the impacts of climate and natural disasters. This can apply to the
wider role of government as an overseer of risk management and may include
actions such as clean-up post disaster or to meet the needs for adaptation,
which were either foreseeable (e.g., long slow drought) or preventable (e.g.,
hurricanes). If markets are unattractive or the risks cannot be managed
effectively then the burden may shift towards government and individuals
to do so (Mills, 2005). In fact this may stimulate government action to
develop new approaches to insurance arrangements (Botzen and van den
Bergh, 2008), for example, public–private partnerships. Also if the stability
of financial markets is threatened then the government may step in to secure
continuing cover (Dobes et al., 2013). At the same time, policy makers aim
for greater engagement of the private sector with a view to achieve higher
efficiency and to support insurance sector growth through the application of
a market based mechanism. This reflects on a wider trend in the governance
of natural disasters and climate risks towards more engagement of multiple
actors, networks, and partnerships, the appearance of multilevel governance
and shifts of responsibility away from the state (Walker et al., 2010). Often
this clashes with the duty to protect consumers and shelter voters from
insurance price rises. This highlights the normative dimension of this issue,
particularly with regards to the question of how to distribute the cost of
losses: Here fundamentally different perspectives exists, such as solidarity
versus risk-based pricing; or tax payer versus insurance holders.
The current flood insurance arrangement in the United Kingdom can be
seen as such a ‘partnership’, a joint approach with roles and responsibilities
divided between government and insurance. But as the current discussion
shows, the roles may change. Insurers have been calling for government inter-
vention in the form of Flood Re, which is proposed as a not-for-profit scheme,
run by the private market and funded through a levy on all policy holders.
During the public consultation phase the Government also presented three
alternative options to Flood Re. While an imposed ‘obligation’ for insurers
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to cover high risks remains the official ‘Plan B’ should Flood Re not deliver,
the other two options have been dismissed by government and industry: free-
market because of the unclear effect on premium levels and direct subsidy
for high risk properties on the ground of being less beneficial than Flood
Re due to potentially placing unsustainable costs on policyholders or the
taxpayer (Defra, 2013a; Surminski and Eldridge, 2014).
3.4 Why is Designing a Flood Insurance Policy Often a Highly Political
Undertaking?
There are a range of political motivations at play when considering intro-
duction or reform of flood insurance schemes, showing that the pendulum
of political support can swing in many directions (see for example Schwarze
and Wagner (2007) for an analysis of the German natural hazard insur-
ance market). On the one hand there is the aim of reducing current public
expenditure for flood losses, while at the same time there are political con-
siderations such as the need to maintain a visible ‘helping hand’ function
after a disaster. This is particularly relevant in the run-up to elections, as an
elected official may deliberately not choose to increase spending and hence
raise taxes within their elected period, particularly when no clear benefits
are visible during this time.
The current debate in the United Kingdom highlights the challenges with
the existing flood insurance agreement, the SoP recently coming to an end
(30 June 2013) and the move towards a new flood insurance scheme, termed
Flood Re (due Summer, 2015). This change is principally due to the need
to address rising losses. At the start of the negotiations a set of principles
were published by the government (Box 1) outlining the vision for flood
insurance.
Achieving all of these aims is proving extremely difficult. The proposed
Flood Re, takes principles 1, 3 and 8 at its core and aims to ‘ensure the
availability and affordability of flood insurance, without placing unsustain-
able costs on wider policyholders and the taxpayer’ (Defra, 2013a). However,
the ‘value for money’ aspect of this is highly debatable as the scheme does
not meet the minimum government standard for cost-benefits (Defra, 2013a,
p. 30; 2013b), while the sustainability in the long run is questionable, as risk
reduction measures are almost absent from the scheme. See also Section 4.2.
(Surminski and Eldridge, 2013).
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Box 1. Principles for flood insurance, Source: Defra (2011, p. 5).
The underlying risk information can also become a topic for political
debate, particularly if it has implications on the price of insurance. An exam-
ple is the debate about windstorm insurance in Florida: A hurricane risk
model developed to support insurance decisions in Florida was not licensed
by the insurance regulator as modellers proposed to break with the tradition
of averaging hurricane losses over the long term by giving more weight to
higher hurricane activity in recent years (Phelan et al., 2011), which would
have led to higher premiums. Also, decision on risk thresholds and coverage
limits can be subject to political negotiations between decision makers and
stakeholders — as seen in the United Kingdom, where the current 75-year
return period threshold for flood insurance in the United Kingdom was a
compromise between industry and government.
4 The Challenge of Rising Flood Losses
The current public discourse about flood insurance is focused on two aspects:
reforming existing insurance schemes, and developing insurance solutions
where none exist. Examples for the first are the United Kingdom, Germany
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and the United States, while efforts to introduce new schemes are visible not
only in several developing countries, but also in more established markets,
such as the Netherlands.
The objectives behind each flood insurance offering may differ across coun-
tries, but the underlying considerations are fairly similar and can be traced
back to the pillars described in Section 3:
• Who pays and how much?
• What is the role of private insurers and the role of government?
• How does the scheme work in technical terms?
Finding answers to these questions requires political negotiations to deter-
mine regulation and pricing; an understanding of market behaviour and
consumer choices; as well as technical know-how, including access to flood
risk data and loss models. Flood insurance is often regarded as the most
technically challenging type of insurance due to a lack of accurate assess-
ment of exposure, difficulty in estimating the probability of occurrence
of an event and potential losses faced (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2008;
Swiss Re, 2012). In response, the industry has focused on improving the
underlying risk data and their modelling capacity, often in close collabora-
tion with public authorities. One example of this is the HORA initiative
(see Stiefelmeyer and Hlatky, 2008), an Austrian public–private partnership
(PPP) led by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and
Water Management (BMLFUW) and the Austrian Insurance Association
(VVO). The collaboration seeks to provide the public with information for
the self-assessment of risk through online mapping of risk zones for both
flood (termed the HORA model), earthquake and hail. The key driver behind
these efforts is a recognition that flood losses are increasing. In addition
to the literature strands described above there is a more recent, slightly
broader, sometimes multidisciplinary work on flood risk management emerg-
ing, where flood insurance is considered as one tool amongst others: evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of different flood risk management methods (Hansson
et al., 2008), or flood risk assessment where insurance is considered as a
potential driver or mediating factor. Here a number of papers consider the
implications of climate change (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2008; Filatova,
2013; Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2013), which will be explored in Section 4.1.
Very limited work has focused on the prevention role of insurance in the
context of flood risk.
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4.1 Current and Future Loss-trends
Flooding across Europe from 2000 and 2012 resulted in average annual losses
of 4.2 billion, this is expected to rise into the future with an estimate of
23.5 billion of loss by the year 2050, as compared to an average of 4 billion
in 2010 (Jongman et al., 2014). These growing losses are putting pressure
on affordability and availability of flood insurance — a challenge that is
expected to increase, due to socio-economic drivers and climate change.
Any assessment of climate change impacts needs to take into account
both the physical aspects of a changing climate (hazard), and the socio-
economic aspects that will determine the consequences that hazards can
have. Recent work in this area has focussed on the linkages between different
risk drivers, recognizing that climate change can exacerbate the risks arising
from other trends such as urbanization and population growth (UNISDR,
2011). This has been investigated by a recent World Bank study into impacts
of sea-level risk and storm surges for 393 cities in 31 developing countries.
The report finds high asymmetries in terms of projected impacts, when
taking into account population growth and economic development: ‘‘Our
results suggest gross inequality in the heightened impact of future disas-
ters, with 50% of the burden falling on the residents of 10 Asian cities and
over 40% falling on Manila, Karachi, and Jakarta alone’’ (Brecht et al.,
2012).
Climate change has raised several questions regarding the role of insur-
ance. Most research in this area has explored the impact that climate change
could have on risk trends and risk patterns and what implications this may
have for assessing risks and for the provision of future climate and natural
disaster insurance (Botzen et al., 2010; IPCC, 2014; Mills, 2009). A recent
example is an investigation of the warming of the oceans and the implications
that may result for the (re)insurance industry (The Geneva Association,
2013). Yet it remains unclear how climate change will feature in the risk
profile. The risks and uncertainties arise not only directly from the physical
impacts of climatic changes such as extreme weather events, natural dis-
asters or slow-onset developments such as sea-level rise, but also indirectly
from the political responses to these challenges.
The fine balance between affordability and profitability could therefore
be affected by climate change, particularly if insurers fail to reflect on
changing risk trends in their solvency arrangements, products or pricing
regimes (Collier et al., 2009). How they do this will not only depend on not
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only regulatory policies, but also market conditions. Ranger and Surminski
(2013) identify both positive and negative scenarios for insurance resulting
from differences in policy responses to climate change, regulatory levels,
company strategy, risk awareness and willingness-to-pay (Ranger and
Surminski, 2013).
Theory and evidence from existing insurance markets suggests that a
‘‘riskier and more uncertain world would be associated with an increase in
insurance demand, at least until some local threshold were reached where
the affordability of insurance or the insurability of risk were threatened’’
(Ranger and Surminski, 2011).
However, the influence of climate change on insurance provision is
expected to be multifaceted, complex and regionally variable. For those who
provide insurance risk transfer, this creates not only new risks, but also
opportunities. One such opportunity is presented by the Climate Corpora-
tion, a business that provides weather information and offers insurance to
farmers. Offering data, modelling and weather simulations the Climate Cor-
poration (2014) aims to ‘protect and improve’ farming operations. Coupled
with insurance provision that automatically pays out in the event of a loss
the scheme demonstrates the potential for more climate linked measures to
aid knowledge, awareness and financial protection.
The insurance industry is often perceived as a conservative sector, with
long traditions, slow innovation and little public visibility. However in the
context of natural disaster risks and climate change, the industry has been
surprisingly outspoken and played an increasingly public role over the last
two decades. Some private insurance companies have explored the issue of
climate change by collaborating with scientists, publicly engaging in pol-
icy debates, and also assessing the climate impacts on and opportunities
for their own products (Mills, 2009). Individual companies as well as sector
initiatives such as ClimateWise and UNEPFI’s Insurance Working Group,
as well as industry organisations such as the Chartered Insurance Institute,
the Geneva Association and national trade bodies, have started to publicly
address this issue through statements and events. This public advocacy and
outreach role has given the industry external visibility. In addition there is
evidence of efforts led by the industry to improve risk information and knowl-
edge: Several large reinsurers and insurers engage in public risk modelling
exercises, sponsor research and science. Examples are HORA in Austria
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(Stiefelmeyer and Hlatky, 2008), ZU¨RS in Germany (Burghoff, 2012) and
the engagement of the Association of British Insurers with public bodies
such as the Environment Agency to improve the quality of flood maps in
the United Kingdom (ABI, 2008).
There are signs that underwriting has become more technically oriented:
applying sophisticated models and risk assessments, leading to risk-based
approaches, but particularly with regards to residential risks and micro-
insurance this often stands in contrast to the aim of ensuring affordability,
and often faces regulatory barriers (Surminski et al., 2014).
Beyond the activities in established markets there is also the quest for new
growth markets (Guy Carpenter, 2012). Market players such as Lloyds of
London warn of the growing underinsurance challenge (Lloyd’s, 2012), iden-
tifying emerging markets as strategic growth targets. When entering these
emerging markets, (re)insurers have to focus on their lack of understand-
ing of natural catastrophes in these areas, the problems of pricing business
correctly and monitoring exposure growth without suitable risk modelling
tools. In many developing countries the data needed to underwrite flood
risk is often not readily available, and there is no commercial case for pri-
vate sector actors to develop such models on their own. This has led to an
increased focus on public–private partnerships: ClimateWise, the industry-
led climate initiative launched in 2008, points to the need for ‘public–private
partnerships’ in order to exhaust the full potential of ‘what is possible in
building resilience to climate change impacts’. ClimateWise (2011b) refers
to pilot projects and initiatives where its members are engaged and ‘where
national governments have come together with other relevant organisations
such as private (re)insurers, non-governmental organisations and commu-
nity groups to develop and implement new climate risk management and
insurance partnerships’.
The Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), set up in April 2005 and
particularly active at the UN level, promotes the use of insurance as a tool
supported by both the private and public–private sectors, in the quest to
develop new insurance solutions. The initiative suggests that such a part-
nership could ‘offer the market sustainability of private sector approaches,
and the flexibility and innovation of public sector approaches (and that)
subsidiarity means that each partner will have clearly defined, distinct roles
to play’ (MCII, 2011).
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4.2 Physical Risk Reduction and Insurance
One response to the concerns about rising risk levels could be a greater
linkage between insurance risk transfer and physical risk reduction mea-
sures. This is based on the hypothesis that insurance can play a role in
driving risk behaviour. The IPCC’s report on managing the risk of extreme
events (IPCC, 2012) concludes that ‘risk sharing (formal insurance, micro-
insurance, crop insurance) can be a tool for risk reduction and for recovering
livelihoods’ particularly in the face of extreme weather events, but warns
that it could also provide disincentives, if not correctly structured. The key
message emerging from this literature is that the design and implementation
of a risk transfer scheme will determine the promotion of risk reduction and
the level or moral hazard (Ranger et al., 2011b).
In theory insurance can attach a price tag to risks and send a signal to
agents such as policy holders, governments or insurers themselves, incen-
tivising or even forcing them to address the underlying risk (see, for exam-
ple, Kunreuther, 1996; Botzen et al., 2009; Botzen and van den Bergh,
2009; Shilling et al., 1989; Treby et al., 2006). Insurance incentives are
also stated to aid implementation of flood risk reduction measures (Botzen
et al., 2009; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Crichton, 2008; Kunreuther,
1996; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). When the premium is priced
in line with the risk, insurance can act in two fundamental ways; for exam-
ple, it can prevent settlement in an area of increased flood risk with the
premium payment (as compared to a lower risk zone) expected to deter
people away from such areas — this also has the additional benefit of not
impacting on the wider community, such as the tax payer or other policy
holders through ex post aid and subsidised premiums respectively (Fila-
tova, 2013). Secondly, risk reflective pricing can encourage engagement with
mitigation measures (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009), for example
through insurance discounts once the measures are installed. There are many
risk management options in different sectors that insurance may incentivize
such as:
• Flood proofing of buildings and property,
• Retrofitting of houses (e.g., against windstorm),
• Local flood protection measures,
• Flood proofing infrastructure,
• Building larger scale flood protection schemes.
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• Switching to more heat and drought resistance cultivars
• Implementation of more efficient irrigation measures
(from Bra¨uninger et al., 2011)
Some recent studies have explored the link between flood risk reduction
measures and premium pricing, through methods such as interviews with the
insured, hypothetical modelling and willingness to pay exercises: Thieken
et al. (2006) found that in Germany insured households are more likely to
undertake risk reduction measures than uninsured, suggesting that flood
insurance sets an incentive for policy holders to take action. For the Nether-
lands, Botzen et al. (2009) suggests that many homeowners would be willing
to make investments in risk reduction if this would lead to an insurance
premium reduction: ‘In particular, approximately two-thirds are willing to
invest in water barriers (. . .) and about a fifth are willing to replace floor
types that are vulnerable to flooding with water resistant floor types. Fur-
thermore, about a quarter are willing to move central heating installations
to floors safe against flooding’ (Botzen et al., 2009).
But the practice shows that a range of factors prevent this from happen-
ing: the largest barrier is considered to be the absence of adequate risk-based
pricing (Kunreuther, 1996) due to its conflict with affordability of cover,
while the solidarity principle of insurance also hampers risk reflective pric-
ing. But even if risk-based pricing would be applied Bra¨uninger et al. (2011)
note several issues that would need to be addressed in order to achieve
risk reduction: mis-match between required prevention investment by pol-
icy holders and the premium savings; the short term nature of insurance
contracts; simplified rating structures used by insurers; as well as a pre-
vailing uncertainty about the benefits of risk reduction measures- due to
lack of standardised assessment methods, and the need for active involve-
ment of policy holders to put in place and operate those mitigation mea-
sures (Bra¨uninger et al., 2011). Other barriers to linking risk reduction and
insurance exist and include limited institutional capacity, weak regulatory
systems and insufficient understanding of the instruments amongst stake-
holders (Suarez and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2011; Surminski and Oramas-Dorta,
2013).
In the context of linking risk reduction and risk transfer there is evidence
of a range of activities conducted by the industry to foster prevention efforts.
Surminski (2010) provides an illustration of how some insurers are engaged
in risk reduction activities in the context of climate adaptation (Table 3).
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Table 3. A range of case studies indicating the insurers involved, location
and their adaptation focus.
Source: Surminski (2010).
The initiatives identified are all based in established insurance markets. They
include raising awareness of disaster risks, promoting action by government,
and supporting action by individuals through incentives, information, finan-
cial support and terms and conditions for policies.
Despite these initiatives, it remains unclear to what extent they are
effective and how they could be scaled up if deemed a success. For example
the terms and conditions of an insurance policy, such as deductibles and
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exclusions, are widely used to manage risks in commercial insurance and
motor insurance, but are facing some limitations in property insurance.
These aim not only to prevent moral hazard, but also seek to maintain the
insurability of high risk properties. This is evident in the UK residential
property market, where flood deductibles are being applied to homes
that have been flooded several times (Grey and Pickard, 2013). But the
effectiveness in reducing moral hazards in relation to residential natural
catastrophe risks remains unclear. For example, a survey of 400 homeowners
in the United Kingdom by Lamond et al. (2009) shows that insurers have
been ineffective in encouraging their policyholders to adopt flood mitigation
measures. As Ball et al. (2013) state the adoption of property level measures
are difficult to assess so insurers do not necessarily see them as a basis
for lowering policy costs. While there is evidence for risk information work
conducted by the industry, providing online flood risk information and
raising awareness with customers and government (ABI, 2012), this is not
linked to the insurance policy documentation.
In the United States, the NFIP includes building code regulations and
mitigation grant programmes at part of its requirements for cover (Paudel
et al., 2012; Thomas and Leichenko, 2011). This entitles policyholders who
have gone beyond minimum requirements for building elevation to be eli-
gible for premium discounts. It also applies to communities with adequate
risk management plans, who can receive premiums discounts for all those
policyholders in the community by participating in Community Rating Sys-
tem. While in France deductibles can be increased for policyholders who live
in communities that face repeated flooding and do not have adequate risk
mitigation plans which include damage mitigation measures in place, while
deductibles are lowered if such plans and risk reducing measures are taken
(Poussin et al., 2012). In developing countries there are also a few examples
of direct operational link between risk transfer and risk reduction, for exam-
ple: The Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program
in Ethiopia and the Fondo de Mitigacion del Riesgo Agrario (FMRA) in
Bolivia. How effective these mechanisms are is [‘‘How effective these mecha-
nisms are is difficult to measure, . . . ’’] difficult to measure, particularly as
some of them have only been running for a short time.
The case of flood insurance in the United Kingdom shows the absence
of formal incentive mechanisms in the existing, and in the newly proposed
Flood Re scheme. While rising flood losses and increasing costs of insurance
are the two main reasons for reforming the existing insurance arrangements,
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one important aspect has been widely neglected in the debate: how the
existing arrangement and new flood insurance proposal reflect on the need
to manage rising flood risks (Surminski and Eldridge, 2014).
One particular aspect to consider here is the case for long-term contracts,
since long-term insurance may create incentives for homeowners to imple-
ment risk reducing measures, while there are also clearly limitations to the
use of multi-year contracts (Maynard and Ranger, 2011). An assessment of
long-term flood insurance contracts in the Netherlands finds that the pricing
of such contracts is complicated because of the uncertain future effects of
climate change on flood risks, which could result in mark ups of long-term
insurance premiums (Aerts and Botzen, 2011a, b). However, a study of the
demand for long-term insurance products has shown that consumers may
have a higher willingness-to-pay for long-term flood insurance, than annual
flood insurance because they prefer the price stability offered by long-term
contracts (Botzen et al., 2013). This understanding will require further anal-
ysis to determine how pricing and the potential for long-term insurance
contracts continues into the future, particularly when the understanding of
climate change and modelling accuracy is expected to evolve significantly in
coming years.
Depending on design and implementation an insurance scheme can send
signals to policy makers in support of flood risk management policies, which
would address risk levels and provide political guidance. The clearest link
would be a financial liability, which makes government responsible for paying
certain losses above a loss threshold with an interest in keeping losses low.
This concept is absent from the SoP scheme, and also from the proposed
Flood Re. Throughout the negotiations between industry and government
this appears to have been a critical aspect and there remains a lack of clarity
about how catastrophic losses that might exhaust the pool would be dealt
with.
The agreement from insurers to provide cover under the SoP is based on
the expectation that government would deliver on their commitment of suf-
ficient investment in flood defences and an improved public planning policy,
outlined as clear indicators in the main SoP agreement document: As ‘action
from government’ it lists ‘reducing the probability of flooding in the United
Kindom; at least maintaining investment in flood management each year
and discuss future funding taking into account climate change, implement
reforms to the land use planning system; communicate flood risk effectively
and provide more detailed higher quality flood risk information and develop
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an integrated approach to urban drainage’ (ABI, 2005). While the fulfil-
ment of these policy demands has been subject to debate — particularly
with regards to investment levels, but also about the success of the planning
system — it is a clear lever to steer public policy and government spending,
particularly in times of public spending constraints.
5 Outlook
Flood insurance is a long-established economic tool in some countries, while
non-existent in others. The literature offers a range of explanations for this
‘patchwork’ of flood insurance penetration based on the investigation of
both the demand and supply side. This is reflected in the public discourse
about affordability and availability of this type of insurance. However, there
appears to be a significant gap in terms of understanding the implications of
current and future flood risk trends for the offering of flood insurance. These
trends are likely to pose a significant challenge for the financial compensation
of flood losses, unless more preventative measures such as flood defence
investment and stricter building codes are applied. Effective prevention is
expected to play a significant role for future affordability and availability
of flood insurance. However, it is far from clear how these two approaches
interact, and where the scope for future reform is. Particularly the question
of utilizing flood insurance as a lever for physical risk reduction would benefit
from further empirical and theoretical analysis.
Risk transfer alone, without consideration of risk reduction efforts, is not a
sustainable solution going forward, particularly in the context of a changing
climate and rising flood losses. Moral hazard is a key challenge for any insur-
ance product, as it can undermine the economic benefits of risk transfer and
the wider efforts to reduce risks. While stakeholders have only limited direct
control over the occurrence of a flood, their actions determine the extent
of losses during and after the event. Therefore moral hazard can occur at
government level, where the existence of an insurance scheme may reduce
the urgency to prevent and reduce risks, or at the insured level, where the
purchase of insurance may lead to a false sense of security. In theory risk-
based pricing should help prevent moral hazard and promote risk reduction
behaviour. Evidence of how this works in practice is limited. Due to afford-
ability concerns this may have to be linked to public financial support mea-
sures at least on a temporary basis. There is evidence of a range of further
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activities conducted by the insurance industry to foster disaster prevention
efforts, but it remains unclear to what extent they are effective at house-
hold level and to what extent they could be scaled up if deemed a success.
Other stakeholders may be needed to reflect on the risk reduction potential,
such as property developers, home-builders and mortgage providers in the
context of property insurance.
One important conclusion is to avoid the situation where risk reduc-
tion is seen as a trade-off with affordability and availability. Considering
these aspects as mutually reinforcing seems to be a more sensible approach.
One could argue that risk reduction efforts are essential in maintaining the
insurability of these risks, especially in the context of flooding and other
extreme weather events, and that effective adaptation may actually become
a condition for granting insurance cover in the future.
However, there are also clear limitations: while some risks arising from
flooding can be reduced through better preparedness, there will always be
residual risks that can leave those exposed with significant financial gaps
and increase poverty. What can insurance offer for those risks ‘beyond risk
reduction’ — such as land-loss due to sea level rise? This is starting to be
addressed as part of the Loss and Damage discourse within the international
climate change negotiations (see UNFCCC, 2010, para. 25-29). Progress in
these areas depends on more clarity on the limitations of insurance as a
tool and insurance as a private sector offering. Progress in this area will
depend on a mix of increased evidence and understanding of underlying risk
issues, better collaboration of stakeholders and openness about limitations
and costs. The issue spans many dimensions, which makes innovation and
reform challenging for political decision makers and private companies: the
suitability of insurance depends on the particular risks, political objectives
and the design of a proposed scheme. Reforming existing schemes appears
very challenging, as the case of the UK flood insurance system shows. This
is why the discussions about new schemes in developing countries are so
important. Here is a chance to avoid repeating those past mistakes in estab-
lished markets, particularly regarding the missing link between risk transfer
and risk reduction.
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